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Introduction
Outside of the courtroom, the legal community makes frequent use
of the telephone. Like other modem professionals, judges and lawyers
use the telephone to perform the daily tasks of their office. "Telephone
stand-by" is a familiar mode of readiness for litigators.' Telephonic dep-
ositions have become widely accepted in civil litigation.2 In the criminal
area, the judicial authorization of search warrants by telephone is al-
lowed in federal court3 and several state courts.4 Increasingly, judges
and lawyers are conducting motion practice and oral arguments by tele-
phone.5 During the 1980s, courts in the United States experimented with
using the telephone to transmit a witness' testimony directly into the
courtroom.6 The progress was halting and the courts often imposed on-
1. J. Allison DeFoor II & Robert N. Seechen, Telephone Hearings in Florida, 38 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 593, 595 (1984).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7). The following statutes provide specific authorization for
telephonic depositions: ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7); ARK. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7); COL. R. Civ. P.
30(b)(7); DEL. ST. R. FAM. CT. 30(b)(6) and ST. R. SUPER. CT. 30(b)(7); D.C.R. Civ. P.
30(b)(7); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(7); HAW. R.C.P. 30(b)(7); IOWA R. Civ. P. 140(d); KAN.
R. CIv. P. CODE 60-230(b)(7); LA. C.C.P. ART. 1436.1; ME. R.C.P. 30(b)(7); MD. R. 2-418;
OK. CT. R. AND P. 12 § 3207(c)(7); MASS. R.C.P. 30(b)(7); MINN. R.C.P. 30(b)(7); MISS.
R.C.P. 30(b)(1); MONT. R.C.P. 43.01; NEB. R.C.P. 30(b)(7); NEV. ST. R.C.P. 30(b)(7); N.M.
ST. § 40-4A-12; N.Y. D.H.R. § 465.13(b); N.C. § lA-I, Rule 30(b)(7); N.D.R.C.P. Rule
30(b)(7); OKLA. ST. T. R. § 3230(b)(7); OR. C. P. R. 39C(7); S.C.R.C.P. Rule 30(b)(7); S.D.
15-6-30(b)(7); TENN. R.C.P. Rule 30(b)(7); Tx. R. Civ. P. 202(2); UTAH R.C.P. R. 30(b)(7);
VT. ST. R.C.P. Rule 30(b)(7); WASH. ST. R.C.P. Rule 30(b)(7); W. VA. R.C.P. 30(b)(7); Wis.
804.05 § 8; Wy. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7). Some courts have allowed telephonic depositions without
specific statutory authorization. City of Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309 (Alaska 1985);
Wagner v. Casteel, 663 P.2d 1020 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (before enactment of Arizona's tele-
phonic deposition rule); Patton v. May Dep't Stores Co., 762 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. 1988). But see
Wright v. Forney, 444 N.W.2d 895 (Neb. 1989) (no error in refusing to admit telephonic
deposition found to be cumulative). See For Depositions, Let Your Fingers Do The Walking,
LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Aug. 17, 1981, at 12.
3. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a)(c)(2)(A) (search warrant may be "based upon sworn and oral
testimony communicated by telephone or other appropriate means").
4. See Geoffrey P. Alpert, Telephonic Search Warrants, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 626
nn. 10-12 (1984) and cases cited therein. States that allow telephonic search warrants include
Arizona, California, Montana, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washing-
ton, and Wisconsin. Id.
5. DeFoor & Sechen, supra note 1, at 597-601; Roger A. Hanson et al., Lady Justice-
Only a Phone Call Away, THE JUDGE'S JOURNAL Spring 1981, at 47-49 [hereinafter Lady
Justice]; Roger A. Hanson et al., Telephone Hearings in Civil Trial Courts: What Do Attorneys
Think?, 66 JUDICATURE 408, 413-14 (1983) [hereinafter What Do Attorneys Think?]; Roger A.
Hanson et al., Telephone Conferencing in Criminal Court Cases, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 611,
614-16 (1984) [hereinafter Criminal Conferencing]; Douglas W. Hillman, Telephone Confer-
encing: Togetherness in the UP., 63 Mich. B.J. 345, 346 (1984) (U.P. denotes Michigan's
Upper Peninsula); Stuart R. Pollack, Dial 'C'For Court, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Mar. 6, 1989,
at 6; Phillip Carrizosa, S.E Court To Test Phone Arguments In Law And Motion, L.A. DAILY
JOURNAL, July 15, 1981, at 1.
6. See Michael S. Weber, Annotation, Permissibility of Testimony by Telephone in State
Trial, 85 A.L.R.4th 469 (1991).
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erous conditions on the admission of telephonic testimony. At the same
time, courts continued to allow the taking and courtroom use of deposi-
tions on a permissive standard in civil trials and on a more demanding
standard in criminal trials.
This note proposes that telephonic testimony is generally superior to
a stenographic deposition and should be allowed whenever the applicable
court rules would allow the courtroom use of a stenographic deposition.
While nonstenographic means of transmitting a witness' testimony to the
jury, such as videotaped depositions7 or live video testimony,' may at
some future point replace both stenographic depositions and telephonic
testimony, indeed may replace traditional witness testimony, such tech-
nologies are beyond the scope of this note. In some cases, videotape and
telephonic testimony can complement each other.9
This note is dedicated to the limited comparison of stenographically
recorded depositions to live telephonic testimony and to the simple prop-
osition that the latter, properly conducted, is at least as reliable and more
probative for the jury than the former. Within certain limits,"0 a party
should be able to present the testimony of an unavailable witness either
by telephone or stenographic deposition, depending on the party's indi-
vidual assessment of the relative costs, the nature of the testimony, and
the impact on the jury. In. this note, the term deposition refers to steno-
graphic depositions only, unless otherwise noted.
Part I gives a brief history of the case law that has developed con-
cerning telephonic testimony. Part II proposes a new rule under which
7. See Rebecca White Berch, A Proposal to Amend Rule 30(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Cross-Disciplinary and Empirical Evidence Supporting Presumptive Use of
Video to Record Depositions, 59 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 347 (1990) (advocating that video re-
cording of depositions be the rule and stenographic recording the exception under Rule 30(b));
Andrew T. Citrin, Rules and Case Law Governing Videotape Depositions, 12 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 87 (1988); Thomas S. Riggs III, Note, Federal Rule 30(b)(4) and the Use of Video-
taped Depositions, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 145 (1988). Professor Berch's proposal follows the
model of a proposed uniform state law on videotape depositions, which has been adopted by
North Dakota and Alabama. UNIF. AUDIO-VISUAL DEPOSITION ACT §§ 1-10, 12 U.L.A. 10
(Supp. 1988).
8. Marcia Coyle, TV Testimony, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 23, 1989, at 6 (video testimony of
witnesses transmitted by satellite from New York City to the United States District Court in
Puerto Rico in complex fire disaster case); Martha Middleton, Now Showing-Via Satellite,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 13, 1989, at 3 (video testimony of witnesses transmitted by satellite from
London to Wisconsin state court in failed business joint venture case).
9. See United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1989) (criminal trial; Belgian
authorities refused to allow defendant to attend deposition; defendant's attorneys were present
and defendant was provided with a telephone link; deposition was video taped and video was
later viewed by the judge); Ferrante v. Ferrante, 485 N.Y.S.2d 960, 962 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (civil
trial; 92-year-old woman, who was confined to a nursing home, was allowed to testify by tele-
phone with concurrent video taping; video was later viewed by the jury).
10. See infra subpart II(D).
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telephonic testimony would be allowed under the court rules applicable
to depositions. The primary requirement under this rule is that a witness
be unavailable to testify in person. Subparts II(A) and II(B) clarify the
definition of unavailability in federal court. Subpart II(C) describes the
primary areas of judicial concern about telephonic testimony. Subpart
II(D) outlines a sample procedure for telephonic testimony that ad-
dresses these concerns. Subpart III(A) resolves the impact of the Sixth
Amendment confrontation clause on the use of telephonic testimony by
the prosecution in criminal trials. Subpart III(B) discusses the possible
impact of the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process on the use
of telephonic testimony in criminal trials. Part IV asserts that telephonic
testimony in civil trials does not violate the due process rights of the
objecting party under either an instrumental or intrinsic analysis." Part
V concludes that telephonic testimony provides a valuable tool for the
judiciary to make justice more affordable and accessible.
I
The Judicial Reaction to Telephonic Testimony
In civil trials, 2 there are three general approaches to telephonic tes-
timony: (1) allowing telephonic testimony only on a showing of "special
circumstances," (2) applying established court rules either to bar or al-
low telephonic testimony, or (3) developing new rules to specifically ad-
dress the issue. First, in states with no procedural rule on point, some
courts have allowed telephonic testimony only on a showing of "special
11. This terminology distinguishes between analyzing a process for its value in determin-
ing truth, the instrumental approach, and its effect on the individual participant's sense that
justice has been done, the intrinsic approach. See infra Part IV.
12. Telephonic testimony is more readily accepted in quasi-judicial proceedings such as
administrative hearings. Shaball v. State Compensation Ins. Auth., 799 P.2d 399, 405 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1990); Richardson v. Indus. Comm'n, 701 P.2d 164 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Anders v.
Indus. Comm'n, 649 P.2d 732 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Bray v. Electronic Door-Lift, Inc., 558
So. 2d 43, 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Bandemer v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 562
N.E.2d 6, 7 (Ill. 1990); Babcock v. Employment Div., 696 P.2d 19, 21 (Or. 1985); Knisley v.
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 501 A.2d 1180, 1182 (Pa. 1985) (board must
adopt regulations which incorporate "minimum procedural safeguards" for telephonic hear-
ings); Sherman v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 539 A.2d 23, 25 (Pa. 1988)
(board had not yet adopted the safeguards required by Knisley); see generally Jerome R. Corsi,
Major Findings of the New Mexico Experiment of Teleconferenced Administrative Fair Hear-
ings, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 647 (1984); Jerome R. Corsi & Thomas L. Hurley, Pilot Study
Report on the Use of the Telephone in Administrative Fair Hearings, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 485
(1979); Percy Mallison, Implementing the 1983 Telecommunications in Evidence Act: Model
Rules for Conducting the Public's Business, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 637 (1984). Telephonic
testimony may also be allowed in an arbitration dispute. Kandora v. Blinder, Robinson & Co.,
CIV. A 89-9034, 1990 WL 63510 (E.D. Pa. 1990). But see Gateway Securities, Inc. v. Cre-
peau, CIV. 90-11010-S, 1990 WL 114790 (D. Mass. 1990) (refusal to allow telephonic testi-
mony under arbitration agreement was not reversible error).
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circumstances."' 3 In the most frequently cited case involving "special
circumstances," Ferrante v. Ferrante,4 a New York Superior Court al-
lowed the plaintiff, a 92-year-old woman confined to a nursing home in
Florida, to testify by telephone." A notary public was present with the
plaintiff in Florida and all of the testimony was videotaped for later re-
view by the judge. 6 Few cases have such compelling facts or detailed
precautions. In subsequent cases, the "special circumstances" require-
ment has been used to bar telephonic testimony.
17
Second, courts have interpreted court rules describing the general
manner of courtroom testimony either as barring or allowing telephonic
testimony. The North Dakota Supreme Court held that statutory lan-
guage requiring that testimony be taken "orally and in open court" bars
telephonic testimony.'" Conversely, the Mississippi Supreme Court held
that the same language leaves the question of the admissibility of tele-
phonic testimony up to the "sound discretion of the trial judge," and
upheld the trial court's refusal to allow telephonic testimony.' 9 There-
fore, it is unclear whether such testimony is barred completely or merely
limited to "special circumstances." The Oregon Court of Appeals has
held that a statutory definition of oral examination as "an examination in
the presence of the jury" bars telephonic testimony.2°
Third, Alaska2' and Wisconsin 22 have amended their court rules to
allow telephonic testimony generally in civil trials.2" Since January 1,
13. Byrd v. Nix, 548 So. 2d 1317, 1320 (Miss. 1989) (telephonic testimony barred); Aqua
Marine Prods. v. Pathe Computer Control Sys., 551 A.2d 195, 200 (N.J. 1988) (telephonic
testimony barred); Ferrante, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 962 (telephonic testimony allowed).
14. 485 N.Y.S.2d 960.
15. Id. at 962.
16. Id.
17. Aqua Marine, 551 A.2d at 195; Byrd, 548 So. 2d at 1320.
18. In re Gust, 345 N.W.2d 42 (N.D. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 392 N.W.2d 824
(1986); see N.D. R. Civ. P. 43(a). One year later the same court found that a foundational
videotape deposition was admissible and did not violate the same court rule. Williams County
v. Falcon, 367 N.W.2d 170, 177 (N.D. 1985).
19. Byrd, 548 So. 2d at 1320.
20. In re Gates, 740 P.2d 217, 218 (1987) (state could not present expert testimony by
telephone over father's objection in parental rights termination hearing). Three years later, the
Oregon Court of Appeals decided that the statute in question did not apply to the state's
decision to force a convict to appear by telephone in a hearing to terminate his parental rights
rather than transport him to the hearing. In re Stevens, 786 P.2d 1296, 1299 n.2 (1990) (en
bane), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1071 (1991). See infra note 157.
21. ALASKA Civ. R. 99.
22. Wis. Civ. R. § 807.13 (West Supp. 1990); see John L. Kuehn, Comment, Speaker-
Telephone Testimony in Civil Jury Trials: The Next Best Thing to Being There?, 1988 Wis. L.
REV. 293 (1988).
23. Florida allows telephonic testimony in small claims court, FL. R. SM. CL. 7.140(f),
and for expert testimony in worker's compensation hearings, FL. R. WORK. COMP. 4.111,
upon the agreement of both parties.
1991]
1988, Wisconsin has allowed telephonic testimony if the offering party
can prove to the trial judge that admission of the testimony serves the
interests of justice based on eight specific factors.24 From 1985 to 1989,
Alaska allowed telephonic testimony by a party, counsel, or judge in
nondispositive or nonevidentiary proceedings.2" Effective January 15,
1989,26 the Alaska Supreme Court amended the rule to read, "The court
may allow one or more parties, counsel, witnesses or the judge to partici-
pate telephonically in any hearing or deposition for good cause and in the
absence of substantial prejudice to opposing parties."" Under the
Alaska rule, telephonic testimony is generally admissible evidence. This
reflects Alaska's growing comfort with telephonic testimony in a variety
of judicial circumstances. 28  In criminal trials, the defendant's consti-
tutional right to confront witnesses29. has presented a substantial bar to
the admissibility of telephonic testimony offered by the prosecution. The
Arkansas30 and Colorado31 Supreme Courts have ruled that the admis-
sion of telephonic testimony from a witness who has not been shown to
be unavailable to testify in person violates the defendant's right of con-
frontation.3 2 The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the con-
stitutionality of telephonic testimony. However, the Court's recent
24. Wis. Civ. P. § 807.13 (West Supp. 1990). These are: (1) the possibility of prejudice,
(2) the ability of the proponent to "procure the physical presence of the witness," (3) the
convenience and cost savings of telephonic testimony compared to the importance of the testi-
mony, (4) whether "full effective cross-examination" is possible, (5) the importance of de-
meanor and effect of the surroundings on the witness, (6) the quality of the telephone
transmission, (7) whether a physical liberty interest is at stake, and (8) other relevant factors.
Id.
25. ALASKA S. CT. ORDER 623 (adding ALASKA Civ. R. 99, effective June 15, 1985).
26. ALASKA S. CT. ORDER 922 (amending ALASKA Civ. R. 99(a), effective Jan. 15,
1989).
27. ALASKA Civ. R. 99.
28. See Gregg v. Gregg, 776 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Alaska 1989) (telephonic oath valid outside
of state borders); E.J.S. v. Department of Health and Social Serv., 754 P.2d 749, 752 (Alaska
1988) (father's telephonic participation in hearing to terminate parental rights did not violate
due process); City of Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309, 1315-16 (Alaska 1985) (telephonic
depositions allowed without specific statutory authorization); Boggess v. State, 783 P.2d 1173,
1177-78 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (telephonic testimony to grand jury allowed despite risk that
unauthorized person might have been listening); Elson v. State, 633 P.2d 292, 302 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1981) (telephonic testimony of lab technician did not violate the right of the accused to
confront witnesses).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
30. Rose v. State, 742 S.W.2d 901, 902 (Ark. 1988).
31. Gonsoir v. State, 793 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Colo. 1990); Topping v. State, 793 P.2d 1168,
1172 (Colo. 1990).
32. State v. Aldape, 307 N.W.2d 32, 43 (Iowa 1981). The Iowa Supreme Court found
that the telephonic testimony of two officers in an evidence suppression hearing did not violate
the defendant's right of confrontation. Id. However, the defendant and defendant's counsel
had specifically agreed to allow the telephonic testimony. Id. The holding in Aldape might be
more accurately characterized under a theory of waiver.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 14:107
TELEPHONIC TESTIMONY
decisions in Idaho v. Wright" and Maryland v. Craig34 indicate that the
Confrontation Clause presents a substantial barrier to the prosecution's
use of alternative methods to present the testimony of a witness who is
psychologically rather than physically unavailable to testify.35 A defend-
ant's right to compulsory process 36 also affects the question of telephonic
testimony in criminal trials.
II
A Proposal: An Unavailable Witness May Testify by
Telephone
This note will demonstrate that properly conducted telephonic testi-
mony presents more probative evidence to the jury than the courtroom
use of a deposition. For purposes of this analysis, telephonic testimony
will be treated as particularly'reliable hearsay.37 Because hearsay is gen-
erally barred in court, an exception must be made in order to admit the
testimony. This note proposes that telephonic testimony be admitted
under the same restrictions as another commonly admitted form of hear-
say, the deposition. Depositions are the best comparison to telephonic
testimony for three reasons. First, a deposition, like telephonic testi-
mony, is a consciously chosen alternative to testimony in court. In most
other exceptions to the general rule against hearsay, the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statements are not chosen by the offering
party.3" Both depositions and telephonic testimony allow a party to se-
lect the manner in which the witness' testimony will be presented to the
33. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
34. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
35. A psychologically unavailable witness is one who would suffer such emotional trauma
from testifying in the presence of the defendant that she or he would be unable to communi-
cate. This category has only been applied to abused children. It is not clear that it could be
constitutionally extended to any other application. See infra section III(A)(1).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
37. This note analyzes telephonic testimony as reliable hearsay and compares it to deposi-
tions, another common form of reliable hearsay. However, the author believes that telephonic
testimony is better characterized as the direct testimony of a witness. See Official Airline
Guides, Inc., v. Churchfield Publications, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1393, 1399 n.2 (Or. 1990) (tele-
phonic testimony is made in open court and under oath and therefore not hearsay); cf Mary-
land v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3173-74 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (witness under
Confrontation Clause is one who testifies, not necessarily one who observes the events). The
difficulty is that the testimony is communicated by a technology not yet dreamed of during the
early development of the common law regarding hearsay. However, tradition and the legal
lexicon have forced the discussion into this form of analysis. See United States v. Sunrhodes,
831 F.2d 1537, 1544 n.1 (10th Cir. 1987) (telephonic testimony is hearsay under FED. R.
EvID. 801(c)).
38. For example, excited utterances, FED. R. EvID. 803(2), and business records, FED. R.
EVID. 803(6), are considered reliable precisely because the declarant is assumed to have rea-
sons to make that statement other than courtroom advantage.
1991]
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jury when certain requirements are met. 9 Second, depositions have spe-
cific authorization.' This means that the standards are explicit and sta-
ble. Third, the frequency of depositions in civil trials means that the
statutory law is supplemented by an adequate amount of case law.
Historically, depositions have brought a cold transcript to the trier
of fact. While this was better than no testimony at all, the wide accept-
ance of telephone technology in the United States has provided another
alternative. With proper safeguards, jurors can hear the testimony of an
unavailable witness from her own mouth. Therefore, this note proposes
the following general rule to govern the admission of telephonic testi-
mony in civil and criminal trials:
A witness who is unavailable to testify in person will be allowed to
testify by telephone, absent a showing of prejudice to the objecting
party or delay to the trial process.
A witness is unavailable to testify in person if a prior valid deposition
of the witness would be admissible under the applicable court rules at
the time that the telephonic testimony is offered. Prejudice to the ob-
jecting party consists of: (1) inadequate notice or (2) a finding that the
trier of fact would receive more reliable information from a steno-
graphic deposition than from telephonic testimony. In making this de-
termination, the trial court will give due regard to the importance of
allowing the trier of fact to evaluate the vocal demeanor of the witness.
This proposed rule adopts the Alaska approach which makes tele-
phonic testimony generally admissible evidence. The objecting party has
the burden of showing prejudice. Under the proposed rule, prejudice is
limited to inadequate notice or a specific finding that a deposition is more
reliable under the circumstances. This provision forces judges to clearly
describe the difficulty of allowing the witness to testify by telephone. It
does not allow a judge to rely on a vague discomfort with the novelty of
telephonic testimony. A judge could meet the standard of prejudice
under the proposed rule by a specific finding that the testimony required
a physical demonstration by the witness, or that the witness intends to
testify from or the objecting party intends to cross-examine the witness
with multiple or complex documents that cannot be copied and sent to
the witness in a timely manner. Prejudice is limited to a comparison
between telephonic testimony and stenographic depositions. The exist-
ence of video technology does not affect this comparison of the two or the
proposition that the former should be allowed under the existing court
39. Deposition procedures typically include restrictions on both the taking of the deposi-
tion and its subsequent use in court. FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (taking civil deposition); FED. R. Civ.
P. 32 (using civil deposition); FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 (taking criminal deposition); FED. R. EvID.
804 (using criminal deposition). In telephonic testimony, the taking and use are collapsed into
one event.
40. See infra subparts II(A) and II(B).
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rules applicable to the latter.4 The offering party has the burden of
proving the unavailability of the witness, but does not have to show any
"special circumstances" to justify the use of telephonic testimony, just as
she would not be forced to show "special circumstances" to justify the
use of a deposition.
In both civil and criminal law, witness unavailability for deposition
practice is a term of art with specific definitions in each jurisdiction. In
order to demonstrate the practical consequences of the proposed rule,
the following sections discuss witness unavailability for deposition pur-
poses in federal courts.
A. Witness Unavailability in Civil Trials Under the Federal Rules
In civil trials, a party may generally take the deposition of a witness
without the leave of the court if the offering party gives the opposing
party reasonable notice.42 However, to use the deposition in court, the
offering party must show that the witness is unavailable to testify in per-
son at the time of trial. A witness is considered unavailable if the court
finds that: (1) the witness is more than 100 miles from the place of trial
or out of the United States, unless the offering party has procured the
witness' absence,43 (2) the witness is unable to attend because of age,
illness, infirmity, or imprisonment," or (3) the offering party has been
unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena.45 The of-
fering party has the burden of showing that the witness fits one of the
above definitions.46 Applying these lenient standards of unavailability
would result in the frequent admission of telephonic testimony in civil
trials.47
41. See supra notes 7 & 8.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 30. The primary restriction is that a plaintiff may not take a deposi-
tion within 30 days of service of the original summons unless the defendant has already re-
quested a deposition. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a). The primary exception to this restriction is that a
plaintiff may take the deposition, regardless of the time from the original summons, if the
plaintiff certifies that the witness is about to become unavailable. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(2).
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(C).
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(D). In addition, a deposition may be used if the witness is
dead, FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(A), or "such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it
desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the
testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used." FED. R. Civ.
P. 32(a)(3)(E). The trial court should have an analogous power to allow telephonic testimony
under "exceptional circumstances."
46. Hanson v. Parkside Surgery Center, 872 F.2d 745 (3d. Cir. 1989); Jauch v. Corley,
830 F.2d 47, 50 (5th Cir. 1987).
47. For a slightly different twist on the issues of witness unavailability and telephonic
testimony in civil trials see Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 768-69 (3d Cir. 1989),
where the court played an audiotape of the testimony of an absent witness and gave a "missing
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B. Witness Unavailability in Criminal Trials Under the Federal Rules
In criminal trials, a party may take a deposition only on the leave of
the court through a showing of "exceptional circumstances. ' 4 The pres-
ent unavailability of a witness to testify is an exceptional circumstance
which will allow the taking of a deposition.49 In criminal trials, a witness
is considered unavailable5° if the court finds that the witness is unable to
testify due to a physical or mental illness5 or the offering party has been
unable to procure her attendance by process or other "reasonable
means."3 2 Unlike civil trials, there is no general distance from the place
of trial that is sufficient to show witness unavailability. Instead, a witness
must be beyond the subpoena power of the court or unable to travel due
to illness.5 3 In criminal cases, the subpoena power of the federal court
covers the entire country and in some situations, beyond the borders of
the United States.54 Under the Confrontation Clause, the prosecution
must make a good faith effort to obtain the presence of the witness at
trial before a deposition may be used.55 However, the prosecution is not
required to make a futile gesture if the party is beyond the subpoena
power of the court and clearly refuses to testify.56 Even if a party is
witness" instruction. The author does not believe that a missing witness instruction is appro-
priate for telephonic witnesses.
48. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a).
49. United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354, 360 (7th Cir. 1986).
50. Unavailability under this section is physical rather than psychological. See infra sec-
tion III(A)(1).
51. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4). See United States v. Keithan, 751 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1984) (87-
year-old witness who could not walk due to back condition and 83-year-old witness confined to
home due to heart condition are unavailable to testify).
52. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5). In addition, a witness is considered unavailable to testify if
she has a valid privilege, FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1), persists in refusing to testify on the subject
despite a court order, FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(2), testifies to a lack of memory, FED. R. EVID.
804(a)(3), or is dead, FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4). However, where a witness has a valid privilege
or refuses a court order to testify, the difficulty may be that the witness refuses to travel. The
witness may be willing to waive her privilege or consent to a subpoena if she is allowed to
testify by telephone. In these instances, the court should make it clear on the record that this
was the only way to obtain the testimony. See U.S. v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1980)
(actual court order and witness' clear refusal to obey are required to comply with FED. R.
EVID. 804(a)(2)). The author believes that the use of telephonic testimony under these circum-
stances would be rare.
53. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
54. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(e); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1783(a) (West 1966) (allows the subpoena of a
United States national or resident in a foreign country "if the court finds that particular testi-
mony.., is necessary in the interest of justice"). A deposition taken under foreign rules may
be admissible in federal court even when the foreign procedures are radically different from
United States deposition rules. See Michael J. Burke, Note, United States v. Salim: A Harbin-
ger for Federal Prosecutions Using Depositions Taken Abroad, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 895 (1990).
55. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968).
56. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 212 (1972); United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d
354, 360 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[flutility excuses a request"); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 14:107
TELEPHONIC TESTIMONY
beyond the reach of the court's subpoena power, the offering party is
required to use "other reasonable means" to obtain the attendance of the
witness. 7 This language may require that the government offer to pay
the travel expenses of the witness.5" A witness is not considered unavail-
able if the unavailability is due to the wrongdoing of the offering party.
59
This standard of unavailability is much more rigorous than the civil stan-
dard and would result in the admission of telephonic testimony only in
extreme conditions. The primary uses of telephonic testimony in crimi-
nal trials would be for witnesses who are immobilized by illness or living
in a foreign country and refuse to appear.
C. Judicial Concern About Telephonic Testimony
Telephonic testimony has raised concerns in three general areas: (1)
the lack of a physical appearance by the witness in court, (2) the lack of
control over the witness and her surroundings, and (3) the inability of the
court and jury to see the witness. First, the telephonic witness is never
physically present in the courtroom. This may mean that the witness is
more likely to lie. One of the principal ways to insure witness veracity is
by administering an oath.' The witness may not clearly understand that
a telephonic oath is valid and can result in perjury charges.61 Courts
have opined that a witness is less likely to lie directly to the face of the
defendant or opposing party.62 In criminal trials, the lack of a physical
meeting between the defendant and the witness may violate the defend-
ant's right of confrontation.63 Second, the court has less control over the
witness' surroundings. A bad telephone connection may mean that the
court, counsel, jurors, or court reporter will mishear the witness or that
the witness will mishear the question. A witness may be 'coached' dur-
ing her testimony with visual signals that the court cannot detect. 64 A
74 (1980) ("[t]he law does not require the doing of a futile act"). The question is one of
reasonableness. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189 n.22 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
57. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5). .
58. See United States v. Johnpoll, 739 F.2d 702, 709 (2d Cir. 1984); see also FED. R.
CRIM. P. 15(c) (authorizing the court to pay the defendant's expenses to attend the deposition
if the government or an indigent defendant requested the deposition).
59. FED. R. EvID. 804(a).
60. Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (oath impresses witness "with the seriousness of the matter and
guard[s] against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury").
61. Gregg v. Gregg, 776 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Alaska 1989) (telephonic oath valid outside of
state's boundaries).
62. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) ("It is always more difficult to tell a lie about
a person 'to his face' than 'behind his back.' ").
63. See infra subpart III(A).
64. Phillips v. Venker, 557 A.2d 1338, 1342 (Md. 1989) (dicta discusses general reluc-




witness may testify from documents or refer to visual aids which are not
present before the court.65 Conversely, a witness may be unable to an-
swer a question that refers to documents she does not possess.66 If a
witness misbehaves, a court has few options to compel proper conduct
short of terminating the testimony.67 Most upsetting to a court, the wit-
ness may be lying about her identity.6 Third, the fact finder cannot see
the witness. Visual demeanor is commonly thought to be an aid in deter-
mining if a witness is lying.69 Visual demeanor may also tell a juror
something about how certain the witness is of her testimony and there-
fore how much weight to give the testimony.
Carefully designed procedures can avoid most of the perceived
problems with telephonic testimony. The following procedure seeks to
impress the witness with the oath and the solemn nature of the testimony
in order to encourage witness veracity. It also seeks to assure the judge's
control over the witness' surroundings in order to prevent witness mis-
conduct. The lack of visual demeanor is a limitation inherent in tele-
phonic testimony. However, the use of depositions in civil and criminal
trials suffers from the same limitation.
D. A Sample Procedure
70
Prior to the day of trial, the offering party makes arrangements for a
notary public or foreign equivalent to be present with the witness during
the testimony. All documents to which the witness will be referring are
65. Ex rel. Gust, 345 N.W.2d 42, 45 (N.D. 1984) (telephonic testimony does not "disclose
if the witness is using or relying upon any notes or documents"); Knisley v. Commonwealth,
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 501 A.2d 1180, 1182 (Pa. 1985) (witness might
"refer to records or notes" not in evidence).
66. Archem, Inc. v. Simo, 549 N.E.2d 1054, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (witness "was
unresponsive to questions referring him to prior testimony because he did not have a transcript
in front of him").
67. Byrd v. Nix, 548 So. 2d 1317, 1318 (Miss. 1989) ("no control over the witness"); cf
Criminal Conferencing supra note 5, at 616 (success of telephone conferencing experiment was
partially due to careful procedures to insure "judicial control, order and decorum").
68. Aqua Marine Prods. v. Pathe Computer Control Sys., 551 A.2d 195, 200 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1988) ("There was no way to ascertain [witness'] identity, even to assure that he
was who he said he was."); Byrd, 548 So. 2d at 1318 ("[T]he Court would have no real way of
really knowing the identity of the person on the other end of the telephone .... ); Knisley, 501
A.2d at 1182 (potential area of abuse is "witnesses fraudulently misrepresenting their
identities").
69. Simo, 549 N.E.2d at 1060; State v. Aldape, 307 N.W.2d 32, 43 (Iowa 1981); Ex rel.
Gust, 345 N.W.2d at 45; Aqua Marine, 551 A.2d at 200; In re Stevens, 786 P.2d 1296, 1300-01
(Or. App. 1990) (Newman, J., dissenting); Babcock v. Employment Div., 696 P.2d 19, 21 (Or.
App. 1985).
70. This sample procedure is partially adapted from an excellent article proposing various
methods to allow telephone testimony under California law. L.F. Haeberle, III, Court
Congestion and Delay--Use of Speaker Telephones or Picturephones in Civil Cases When
Witnesses Are Not Available-A Proposal-, 10 LINCOLN L. REV. 49, 57-60 (1977).
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provided to the court and the opposing party. All documents that the
opposing party intends to use during cross-examination are provided to
the witness and the offering party. The court may order that a simulta-
neous transcript be made at the place of testimony which can be com-
pared to the transcript made at trial. On the day scheduled for
testimony, the witness calls from any quiet and convenient location and
leaves the number of that location with the court clerk. As the time for
the testimony nears, the court clerk establishes the connection and veri-
fies that both sides can be clearly heard.71 A speakerphone in the court-
room allows the parties, the court, and the jury to hear the testimony.
When the offering party calls her witness, the court, rather than either
attorney, establishes the basic information. The following is a sample
dialogue to introduce the telephonic testimony of a witness testifying














Hello. This is the Superior Court for the State of Cali-
fornia, Judge Hastings presiding. Is this Ms. Witness?
Yes, this is Ms. Witness.
Is there a notary public present?
Yes, your honor.
<To the Notary> Will you state your name and no-
tary qualifications for the court?
My name is Mr. Notary. I am a notary for the City and
County of New York, number XXXXXX. Expiration
date XX/XX/XXXX.
Mr. Notary, have you verified the identity of Ms.
Witness?
Yes, your honor, I have.
In what form?
She has presented a valid New York driver's license with
the number W12345-12345-12345-64. The picture
on the license appears to be the person currently present.
And have you made a photocopy of the identification
with a signed statement by you certifying this
information?.
I have, your honor.
I would like to remind all parties that this certification
along with any documents used by the witness must be
71. See Criminal Conferencing, supra note 5, at 616 (court initiation of the telephone call
allowed more judicial control in study of telephone hearings for oral arguments in criminal
cases).
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received by this court before the close of evidence or the
jury will be instructed to disregard this testimony. Mr.
Notary, are you and Ms. Witness currently the only per-








We are, your honor.
Mr. Notary, at the close of this testimony I will ask you
to certify that to your knowledge Ms. Witness was not
guided in her responses by any means including, but not
limited to, a person visible to Ms. Witness nodding or
giving other visual signals to the witness. Please be alert
for such activity.
Ms. Witness are you ready to begin to testify?
I am, your honor.
In a moment the court clerk will administer an oath to
you. This is a very serious matter. Although you are
currently outside of the state of California, this oath is
valid and it requires that you speak the truth or be guilty
of perjury. If you perjure yourself here today, the State
of California will pursue your conviction with all power
at its disposal. Do you understand what I have just
said?
I do, your honor.
In addition, I would like to caution you that any miscon-
duct or abusive language will not be tolerated. Are you
ready to proceed.
I am, your honor.
THE COURT: <To the clerk> You may proceed.
< The clerk gives the accepted oath to the witness. >
As courts begin to employ telephonic testimony on a regular basis,
businesses may respond by creating centers with individual facilities and
notary services. As courts become more familiar with this testimony, it
may be allowed without the initial hesitancy and restrictions. For exam-
ple, after much experience with telephonic testimony under a more re-
strictive set of rules, Alaska has adopted a simple rule that allows
telephonic testimony unless prejudice can be shown to the opposing
party.
7 2
72. See supra notes 25-28.
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Telephonic Testimony in Criminal Trials
The United States Constitution provides specific rights to criminal
defendants." The most important of these rights relevant to telephonic
testimony are the Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses and to
have compulsory process to obtain witnesses. These rights mean that a
court has substantially less leeway to use alternative methods of witness
testimony in criminal trials than civil trials. The substantial overlap be-
tween hearsay and confrontation criteria74 may have led some courts to
bar telephonic testimony in civil trials on reasoning better suited to crim-
inal cases." Analyzing the effects of the Confrontation and Compulsory
Process Clauses on telephonic testimony thus serves two purposes: it in-
dicates a limited role for telephonic testimony in criminal trials and it
highlights a traditional preference for a face-to-face meeting between wit-
ness and defendant that has been carried over as an intrinsic aspect of
due process in civil trials.
A. Defendant's Right to Confront Witnesses
[I]t is important in balancing the rights of a defendant, in balancing the
rights of the public, to take into account modem technology ....
[Flace to face is a figure of speech and.., the essence of the language
really means a right to confrontation and cross-examination. It does
not mean a right where credibility is not really at issue to determine
whether or not the color of one's eyes are blue or brown or gray.
76
We have never held . . . that the Confrontation Clause guarantees
criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with
witnesses against them at trial .... The central concern of the Con-
frontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a
criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of
an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.
7 7
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IV-VI.
74. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) ("generally designed to protect similar
values").
75. The special circumstances rule, discussed supra notes 13-17, seems to restrict tele-
phonic testimony in civil trials to the high level of witness unavailability required for deposi-
tions in criminal trials. Compare Ferrante v. Ferrante, 485 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (civil
trial; 92-year-old woman, who was confined to a nursing home was allowed to testify by tele-
phone with concurrent videotaping; video was later viewed by the jury) with United States v.
Keithan, 751 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1984) (criminal trial; 87-year-old witness who could not walk due
to back condition and 83-year old witness confined to home due to heart condition were un-
available to testify under deposition rules).
76. People v. Topping, 764 P.2d 369, 371 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (quoting the trial court),
modified, 793 P.2d 1168 (Colo. 1990) (overruling the quoted language but finding the error
harmless).
77. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3163 (1990).
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The United States Constitution guarantees that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the ight... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him."7 This right is applicable to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 79 The
United States Supreme Court has not decided a case involving the Con-
frontation Clause aspects of telephonic testimony. However, the Court
has decided a number of cases on the use of a witness' prior testimony
where the witness was unavailable to testify at trial.8 0 In addition, the
Colorado Supreme Court recently confronted this issue in the companion
cases of Topping v. State8 and Gonsoir v. State. 2 These cases held,
under similar facts, that admitting a prosecution witness' telephonic tes-
timony violated the defendant's right of confrontation under the United
States Constitution. 3 Because both cases specifically relied on the fact
that the witnesses were available to testify in person, 4 they do not fore-
close the possibility that the telephonic testimony of an unavailable wit-
ness might be constitutionally permissible in a criminal trial under
certain circumstances.
In Topping, the defendant was charged with sexual assault.8 5 The
prosecution sought the testimony of the examining physician to prove
that the victim had been sexually assaulted. 6 The defense did not con-
test the fact that the victim had been assaulted, but simply claimed that
the defendant was not involved. 7 The examining physician, then a resi-
dent of Kentucky, stated that it would be "highly inconvenient" to travel
to Colorado. 8 The trial court allowed the physician to testify by tele-
phone. The trial court specifically found that the physician was a neutral
witness and therefore the reliability of her testimony was substantial.8 9
The supreme court ruled that the telephonic testimony violated the de-
78. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
79. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
80. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); cf
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
81. 793 P.2d 1168 (Colo. 1990).
82. 793 P.2d 1165 (Colo. 1990).
83. Topping, 793 P.2d at 1172; Gonsoir, 793 P.2d at 1167. Because the court ruled that
the telephonic testimony violated the United States Constitution, neither decision addressed
the issue under the Colorado Constitution. Topping, 793 P.2d at 1172 n.10; Gonsoir, 793 P.2d
at 1167-68. State constitutions may provide an independent source of difficulties for telephonic
testimony in criminal trials.
84. See also Rose v. State, 742 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Ark. 1988).
85. Topping, 793 P.2d at 1169.
86. Id. at 1169-70.
87. Id. at 1172 n.ll.
88. Id. at 1169.
89. Id. at 1171 n.8.
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fendant's right of confrontation, but that the error was harmless because
it related only to an uncontested issue.'
In Gonsoir, the defendant was charged with driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol. 9 The prosecution wanted the state's chemist to testify
to the results of the blood alcohol tests.92 On the way to the trial, the
chemist was stranded in Denver due to a canceled flight.93 The trial
court allowed the chemist to testify by telephone. The prosecution stated
that the chemist's testimony would not be rebutted and that "matters
such as her demeanor on the witness stand [were] not going to make that
much of a difference." 94 However, during testimony it became apparent
that the chemist was testifying from a different set of documents than
from those present at the trial court.9 5 The supreme court ruled that the
telephonic testimony violated the defendant's right of confrontation and
was not harmless.96
In Topping and Gonsoir, the prosecution argued that telephonic tes-
timony should be admitted by analogy to prior testimony of a witness.97
In Ohio v Roberts,9" the United States Supreme Court held that testi-
mony from a preliminary hearing could be constitutionally used against
the defendant if the witness was unavailable to testify. 99 Roberts clarified
an emerging two-step test to determine the validity of hearsay exceptions
under the Confrontation Clause. Hearsay may constitutionally be admit-
ted if (1) the witness is unavailable to testify and (2) the hearsay state-
ment possesses sufficient "indicia of reliability ' ' "° to give the trier of fact
a satisfactory basis for evaluating its truth.' In Topping and Gonsoir,
the Colorado Supreme Court declined to discuss the reliability of tele-
phonic testimony because the witnesses were not shown to be
unavailable.'o 2
90. Id. at 1172.
91. Gonsoir v. State, 793 P.2d 1165, 1165 n.3 (Colo. 1990). The defendant was also
charged with driving with excessive blood alcohol, failing to produce proof of insurance, and
failure to obtain valid registration for his automobile. It at 1165 nn.4 & 6.
92. Id. at 1165-66.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1166.
95. Id. at 1166 n.8.
96. Id. at 1167 n.9.
97. Topping v. State, 793 P.2d 1168, 1171-72 (Colo. 1990); Gonsoir, 793 P.2d at 1167.
98. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
99. Id. at 77.
100. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
101. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980) (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213
(1972)).
102. Topping, 793 P.2d at 1171 ("Mere inconvenience of a witness does not constitute un-
availability."); Gonsoir, 793 P.2d at 1167. Because, in both decisions, the court insisted that
the witness be unavailable, the court implicitly rejected the idea that a witness may be so
inherently credible that demeanor is unimportant. Unavailability marks a clean division. If a
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Just two days after the decisions in Topping and Gonsoir, the United
States Supreme Court decided its own pair of companion cases under the
Confrontation Clause, Idaho v. Wright10 3 and Maryland v. Craig. 1
These cases delineate the constitutional parameters of alternative forms
of testimony where the witness is physically available to testify but un-
able to face the defendant in open court for psychological reasons. Be-
cause the proposal for telephonic testimony in this note assumes that the
witness is physically unavailable to testify either due to illness or a refusal
coupled with the court's inability to compel attendance, it is important to
address the unavailability issues raised in Wright and Craig first.
1. The First Step in the Roberts Test: Psychological Versus Physical
Unavailability
The first requirement of the two-step Ohio v. Roberts test is that the
witness be unavailable to testify in person.10 Wright and Craig con-
cerned both formal and informal procedures designed to protect a child
abuse victim from the emotional trauma of testifying in the presence of
the accused. These companion cases show a distinct division in the
Court on the idea of psychological unavailability. This idea equates the
inability of a child abuse victim to communicate while in the presence of
the defendant with the traditional idea of a physical absence from the
court. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, and Black-
mun, recognized the concept of psychological unavailability." ° Justice
Scalia, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, rejected the
witness is unavailable to testify in person, hearsay exceptions provide the next best evidence
and therefore might be allowed if reliable. If a witness is available, the Constitution will not
allow any substitutes for the physical presence of the witness in court, whether inherently
reliable or not. This result is consistent with Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990), and
Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990). Wright assumed that the witness was available
before discussing the reliability of the testimony, 110 S. Ct. at 3147, and Craig required a
compelling state interest to substitute for unavailability, 110 S. Ct. at 3167. However, this
view has been challenged. Some courts allow an inherently reliable witness to testify by tele-
phone without a showing of unavailability. United States v. Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d 1537, 1543-
44 (10th Cir. 1987) (fact that witness had "no personal loss at stake" and subject of testimony
was undisputed meant that testimony had sufficient indicia of reliability and telephonic testi-
mony could be admitted despite availability of witness to testify); In re W.J.C., 369 N.W.2d
162, 164 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (content of expert's testimony was "essentially medical in char-
acter" so little value to demeanor evidence; testimony allowed without showing of
unavailability).
103. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
104. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
105. 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
106. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167 (allowed one-way television testimony of abused child, but
used public policy rather than unavailability as rationale); Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3153 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) (dissent would have remanded only on reliability of hearsay statements).
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concept.' 07 Justice O'Connor provided a pragmatic swing vote that took
an equivocal stand on the issue. 08 But no member of the Court, in either
opinion, provided any grounds for questioning the traditional form of
physical unavailability as a sufficient predicate for telephonic testimony.
In Wright, the trial court allowed an examining physician to testify
about statements made by the abused child under a catch-all hearsay ex-
ception. " The trial court ruled that the three-year-old child was incapa-
ble of communicating with the jury and therefore unavailable to
testify."l0 Because defense counsel agreed, the issue was not technically
before the United States Supreme Court."'I The Court assumed, without
deciding, that the child was unavailable to testify under the first step of
the Roberts two-step test. 12 The majority found that the statements
made by the child to the physician lacked "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness" sufficient to justify their admission under the Confron-
tation Clause." 3 Writing for the dissent, Justice Kennedy agreed with
the general criteria of the majority but supported the use of corroborat-
ing testimony at trial to show the trustworthiness of the statements.
1 14
But both the majority and dissent treated unavailability, however de-
fined, as a necessary part of the Roberts test.
In Craig, the trial court allowed an abused child to testify via one-
way television pursuant to statutory procedures."I5 As required by the
statute, the trial court found that "testimony by the child victim in the
courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.""1I6 The Maryland
Court of Appeals held that the procedure violated the defendant's rights
under the Confrontation Clause.'"' In order to meet constitutional stan-
dards, the court of appeals read three additional requirements into the
statute. 118 The first requirement was that the trial court find the inability
to communicate was due to the defendant's presence and not a more
107. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3174 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dissent rejected psychological un-
availability). But see Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3147 (assumed, without deciding, that the abused
child was unavailable to testify).
108. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167; Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3147. Although psychological unavail-
ability was at issue in both of these decisions, neither majority decision confronts the issue
directly.
109. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3144-45.
110. Id. at 3143.
111. Id. at 3147.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 3152-53.
114. Id. at 3153.
115. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3162.
116. Id at 3161.
117. Id. at 3162.
118. Id at 3170.
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general fear of testifying in court." 9 The United States Supreme Court
upheld the imposition of the first requirement but found that the remain-
ing requirements were not constitutionally required. The majority opin-
ion never explicitly used the term "unavailable" in describing the
condition of the child witness."12 Instead, the majority required that the
"denial of... confrontation [be] necessary to further an important public
policy."'' Although reluctant to do so explicitly, the majority replaced
unavailability with public policy as the first step of the Roberts two-step
test. The new public policy step is resolved by holding that the "state's
interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse vic-
tims" may outweigh the "defendant's right to face his or her accusers in
court."' 22 The second step of the Roberts test, which requires that the
statement be reliable, was retained. That the child was under oath, sub-
ject to cross-examination, and visible to the jury for demeanor evidence
established the reliability of the testimony.
123
The Craig dissent, however, was very explicit. 124 It decried the use
of public policy to qualify an explicit constitutional right. 25 It unequivo-
cally stated that the unwillingness to testify in the presence of the defend-
ant "cannot be a valid excuse under the Confrontation Clause, whose
very object is to place the witness under the sometimes hostile glare of
the defendant."' 26 In rejecting psychological unavailability, the dissent
reinforced the concept of physical unavailability. Testimony by one-way
television was simply a weaker alternative to traditional testimony.
"When two versions of the same evidence are available, longstanding
119. Id. The other two requirements are that the child initially be questioned in the pres-
ence of the defendant to determine the extent of any trauma and that the trial court make an
additional finding that the child would suffer emotional trauma from the use of two-way televi-
sion. Id.
120. The only use of the words available, availability, unavailable, or unavailability in the
majority opinion is in a quote from the language used by the Maryland Court of Appeals. The
quote is used in a context that approves the reasoning of the court of appeals rather than the
specific use of the term unavailable. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3170 ("... . question of whether child
is unavailable to testify .... ) (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 560 A.2d 1120, 1126 (Md. 1989)).
121. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3166.
122. Id. at 3167.
123. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3166 (presence of oath, cross-examination, and demeanor "ade-
quately ensures that the testimony is both reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing in
a manner functionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person testimony.").
124. Id. "Seldom has this Court failed so conspicuously to sustain a categorical guarantee
of the Constitution against the tide of prevailing current opinion." Id. at 3171 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
125. Id. at 3172 ("subordination of explicit constitutional text to currently favored public
policy").
126. Id. at 3174.
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principles of the law of hearsay, applicable as well to Confrontation
Clause analysis, favor the better evidence."'
127
Subsequent decisions may clarify the permissible alternative defini-
tions of unavailability for constitutional purposes. 128  But Wright and
Craig, the latest pronouncements by the Court interpreting the Confron-
tation Clause, do not give reason to question the adequacy of physical
unavailability under the Roberts test. This note does not suggest that
telephonic testimony could be used to shield a witness from any trau-
matic aspects of testifying in court. Physical unavailability, using estab-
lished statutory definitions, was made a predicate for the admission of
telephonic testimony. 129 Therefore, if telephonic testimony satisfies the
second step of the Roberts test, it can constitutionally be used to present
the testimony of a physically unavailable witness.
2. The Second Step in the Roberts Test: The Reliability of Telephonic
Testimony
The second step of the Ohio v. Roberts test is that the testimony
possess sufficient indicia of reliability. 130 Testimony at a deposition pos-
sesses indicia of reliability sufficient to be admissible under the Confron-
tation Clause.13' A deposition operates on less formal rules than a full
trial. A deposition provides an opportunity for the defendant to face the
witness as she testifies. A deposition allows a full cross-examination of
the witness. But, a deposition transcript does not communicate any as-
pect of the witness' demeanor to the jury.
Telephonic testimony possesses indicia of reliability equal or supe-
rior to a deposition. Careful procedures work to impress upon the wit-
ness the seriousness of the testimony. 132  Telephonic testimony
conducted by a judge from a criminal court of law can be as formal a
proceeding as a deposition. Telephonic testimony does not preclude the
defendant from being present in front of the witness during her tele-
phonic testimony. As previously discussed, the two primary situations
for the prosecution to use telephonic testimony in a criminal trial are
when the witness is too ill to testify or the witness is in a foreign country
beyond the subpoena power of United States courts. 133 If the witness is
ill and is located close to the trial, allowing the defendant the opportunity
127. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)).
128. See White v. Illinois, 555 N.E.2d 1241 (1990), cerL granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3741 (U.S.
Apr. 29, 1991) (No. 90-6113).
129. See supra Part II.
130. 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
131. United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354, 360 (7th Cir. 1986).
132. See supra subpart II(D).
133. See supra subpart II(B).
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to face the witness as the witness testifies would cause only slight trial
delays. If the witness is located far away from the trial, allowing a physi-
cal confrontation of the witness during the telephonic testimony might
cause a significant delay in the trial. Because the defendant would pre-
sumably want to confront the witness whether the prosecution presented
the testimony by deposition or telephonic testimony, telephonic testi-
mony would not significantly increase the cost of presenting the testi-
mony. However, the live nature of telephonic testimony would require a
continuance of the trial while the defendant travelled to and from the
witness' location. The judge has the inherent power to prefer procedures
that avoid undue delay.' 3 4 The court may order the government to pay
the expenses for an indigent defendant to be present during the witness'
testimony. 135  This leaves the cross-examination and demeanor of the
witness as the primary distinctions between telephonic testimony and
depositions.
In deposition practice, counsel conducts cross-examination in the
presence of the witness. In telephonic testimony, the witness is cross-
examined by telephone. Counsel can only react to the vocal demeanor of
the witness in deciding whether to pursue, expand, or conclude a line of
questioning. This may impair the ability of counsel to effectively cross-
examine the witness and therefore increase the risk that important infor-
mation will be missed. This effect on cross-examination is difficult to
quantify.136 The growing acceptance of telephonic depositions indicates
that attorneys can reach an acceptable level of comfort with this form of
cross-examination after some practice.' 37 Furthermore, because tele-
phonic testimony occurs at trial, rather than before, the attorney can al-
ter her questioning to respond to developments at trial. It is an open
question whether telephonic cross-examination at the time of trial is as
reliable as the reading of a prior deposition.
Against these uncertain risks, telephonic testimony presents one ma-
jor advantage directed at a decisive element in all trials: the credibility of
the witness. In telephonic testimony, unlike depositions, the jury hears
the testimony directly from the witness in her own voice. A deposition is
read to the jury, either by the attorney alone or by the attorney and a
paralegal reading different parts to make the testimony sound more real-
134. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
135. See.FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(c).
136. Criminal Conferencing, supra note 5, at 620 (attorneys using telephone for motion
practice in criminal cases "saw little difference between in-person and telephone hearings"); see
Babcock v. Employment Div., 696 P.2d 19, 21 (Or. 1985) (parties reported satisfaction with
telephonic cross-examination).
137. See supra note 2; In re Juvenile Appeal, 446 A.2d 808, 812 (Conn. 1982) (prisoner
could effectively cross-examine witness by telephone in parental rights termination hearing).
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istic. By contrast, telephonic testimony is real. It is a live interaction
between the witness, the attorneys, and the court. The jury hears the
inflection, pauses, cadence, and mumbles of the witness. Studies have
indicated that fact finders might be more successful in determining truth
from vocal demeanor alone than with both oral and visual demeanor.
131
In other words, people may detect lies better when they hear, and do not
see, the speaker. Like all experiments regarding human behavior, the
assumptions and conclusions of these studies can be questioned. I39 But,
whether or not vocal demeanor is better than the physical presence of the
witness, it is better than no demeanor at all, vocal or visual."4 Because
an attorney is more often looking for a tone of uncertainty in the witness'
voice to cast doubt on her testimony, rather than a "smoking gun" ad-
mission, the oral demeanor of the witness can be vital to effective cross-
examination.
Therefore, if effective safeguards are implemented, telephonic testi-
mony provides the jury with more information and a better basis to
assess that information than a deposition and thus has superior indicia of
reliability. Under the Roberts analysis, admitting telephonic testimony
against a defendant in any situation where the witness' deposition would
be admissible is permitted under the Confrontation Clause.
B. Defendant's Right to Compulsory Process to Obtain Witnesses
In most cases, . . . it violates the defendant's sixth amendment right to
compulsory process to force him to use a substitute form of testimony
in place of an otherwise available witness... just as it would violate his
sixth amendment right of confrontation to force him to accept adverse
testimony in a substitute form where the adverse witness is available to
testify in person.1
4 '
[A] defendant cannot insist on presenting the testimony of a witness in
a substitute form if the witness is available to testify in person .... On
the other hand, if exculpatory testimony would otherwise be unavaila-
138. Bert Pryor & Raymond W. Buchanan, The Effects of a Defendant's Demeanor on
Juror Perceptions of Credibility and Guilt, 34 J. COMMUNICATION 92, 99 (Summer 1984).
139. Kuehn, supra note 22, at 305 n.57 (in any study, both the "truthful" and "lying"
witnesses are lying in that they are both discussing events made up by the researchers).
140. See Official Airline Guides, Inc., v. Churchfield Publications, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1393,
1399 15 n.2 (Or. 1990) (telephonic testimony gives "greater opportunity to evaluate the credi-
bility of the witnesses" than a deposition); In re Juvenile Appeal, 446 A.2d at 812 ("limiting
the opportunity to assess the [witness'] demeanor to its auditory component seems to... entail
only the most marginal risk that the [factfinder] would be misled in evaluating the [witness']
credibility").
141. Peter Westen, Compulsory Process II, 74 MICH. L. REV. 191, 301 (1975) [hereinafter
Compulsory Process I]; see Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV.
71 (1974).
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ble. . . , the defendant has a constitutional right to introduce the evi-
dence in its next most reliable form .... 142
The United States Constitution guarantees that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."' 4 3 This right is applicable
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. '"I The right to compulsory process has been discussed as a mirror
image of the right to confront witnesses: 145 a right of no lesser impor-
tance. 146 "The right to offer the testimony of witnesses and to compel
their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a
defense."' 47 The right to compulsory process is more than a guarantee
that the defendant have equal access to the subpoena power of the state.
It also guarantees that the state cannot arbitrarily deny the defendant an
opportunity to present exculpatory evidence. 148 For telephonic testi-
mony, the Compulsory Process Clause may work as a sword, forcing the
court to accept the telephonic testimony of an unavailable exculpatory
witness, or as a shield, forcing the government to physically produce an
available exculpatory witness in court rather than present the testimony
telephonically. Whether used as a sword or a shield, the right to compul-
sory process will affect the discretion a court has to allow or bar tele-
phonic testimony in criminal trials.14 9
IV
Telephonic Testimony in Civil Trials
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be ... de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."' 50 The
142. Compulsory Process II, supra note 141, at 304.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
144. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
145. Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence
for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 625 (1978) (compulsory process and confrontation
are "the converse of one another").
146. Washington, 388 U.S. at 18 (compulsory process "stands on no lesser footing than the
other Sixth Amendment rights"); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 33 (C.C.D. Va. 1807)
(No. 14,692) (Marshall, Cir. J.) (compulsory process "must be deemed sacred by the courts").
147. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19.
148. Id. at 23 (Texas rule allowing co-conspirator to testify for prosecution but not defense
violates compulsory process clause); see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-303 (1973)
(Mississippi voucher rule and failure to recognize hearsay exception for statements against
nonpecuniary interest prevented defendant from presenting exculpatory evidence and therefore
denied defendant a fair trial under the Due Process Clause).
149. See Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3175 n.2 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that testimony of a defendant's witness by one-way television would implicate the right to
compulsory process rather than the right to confront witnesses but declining to consider the
standards for such an analysis).
150. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'' In civil trials,
the objecting party may complain that the use of telephonic testimony
deprived her of due process. To show a denial of due process, a party
must prove state action. 52 As relevant to telephonic testimony, state
action would arise when the objecting party uses state procedures to en-
force a judgement based on a trial that employed telephonic testimony.
5 3
The constitutionality of allowing a party to substitute telephonic testi-
mony for the use of a deposition will be analyzed by considering both the
instrumental and the intrinsic character of the testimony. This terminol-
ogy has been proposed by Professor Laurence Tribe to describe the two
methods of analysis the United States Supreme Court has used in due
process cases.
1 54
A. An Instrumental Approach
The instrumental approach focuses on the actual value of the partic-
ular process in revealing truth.1 55 For due process analysis, the Court
has formalized the instrumental approach in the balancing test of
Mathews v. Eldridge. 156 This familiar test seeks to balance the govern-
ment's interest in the particular procedure against the risk of error and
the value of the private interests threatened. Like all balancing tests, the
outcome of the Eldridge test is largely determined by the characteriza-
tion of the competing interests and the weight given to each. Members of
the same court can reach different results under an Eldridge analysis by
giving a different characterization or weight to the three factors. 57
151. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
152. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 6 (1883).
153. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
154. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 663-77 (2d ed. 1988).
155. Id. at 666.
156. 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
157. A good example of the effect that recharacterizing an interest or changing its weight
under the Eldridge analysis can have in the context of telephonic testimony is found by com-
paring In re Gates, 740 P.2d 217 (Or. Ct. App. 1987), with In re Stevens, 786 P.2d 1296 (Or.
Ct. App. 1990) (en banc). In Gates, the admission of telephonic testimony against a father in a
parental rights termination hearing was held to violate a state statute requiring that testimony
be given in "the presence of the jury." 740 P.2d at 218. Three years later, the Oregon Court of
Appeals ruled en banc that requiring a convict to testify by telephone at a hearing to terminate
his parental rights rather than requiring the state to pay his travel expenses did not violate his
rights to due process. Stevens, 786 P.2d at 1299-1300. The majority described the father's
presence as "at best a marginal improvement in the factfinding process." Id. at 1299. By
contrast, the dissent regarded an evaluation of the father's demeanor as vital to the question of
terminating parental rights. "To minimize the risk of error, the court must be able to deter-
mine as accurately as possible what kind of person the parent is. Demeanor has an importance
that it does not have in other kinds of proceedings, such as an unemployment compensation
hearing." Id. at 1300. After criticizing the characterization of the importance of demeanor
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The government's interest is the efficient and cost-effective settle-
ment of disputes.' 8 Telephonic testimony is cheaper than a deposition
to the individual litigants. The primary costs in taking a deposition are
the additional transcript required, the travel expenses of the party and
the attorneys, and the attorneys' billing time.' 59 In most cases, tele-
phonic testimony does not require a separate transcript, although the
court may order one made for additional security. Telephonic testimony
saves the expense of travel. Most importantly, telephonic testimony
saves time. As a cost factor, this may be most noticeable in reducing
attorney billing time. Deposition practice requires the attorneys to be
present twice: once to take the deposition and then again to read it to the
jury. If the testimony is important, the entire deposition may be read to
the jury. In this case, telephonic testimony would cut attorney costs to
communicate the testimony by approximately fifty percent. Including
travel time, the savings will be even greater. The substantial savings in
travel expenses, attorney time, and, to a lesser extent, transcription costs,
make telephonic testimony a more cost-effective method of justice. ' 6°
Therefore, the state has no efficiency interest in preferring depositions to
telephonic testimony.
A private litigant's interest is in property.' 6' Although the use of
telephonic testimony in quasi-criminal proceedings, such as termination
of parental rights162 or involuntary commitment,' 63 is a large and inter-
esting topic, it is beyond the scope of this note. 6 Furthermore, the im-
evidence in evaluating the risk of improper result, the dissent went on to criticize the weight
the majority had given to the father's parental rights. The dissent stated that the majority "has'
failed to place on the scale the great weight of [the] father's fundamental interest in his paren-
tal rights." Id. at 1301.
158. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976) ("the administrative burden and other
societal costs" of requiring additional procedures to protect individual rights).
159. Both depositions and telephonic testimony require a notary to be present. Often the
court reporter or one of the attorneys fills this role. In telephonic testimony, if the court
reporter is not a notary or the court did not require a court reporter, a notary will have to be
present with the witness. This is an additional expense, but the savings in attorney billing time
should more than compensate for this increase.
160. See DeFoor & Sechen, supra note 1, at 595-97 (civil); What Do Attorneys Think?,
supra note 5, at 416-18 (civil); Lady Justice, supra note 5, at 57 (civil); Criminal Conferencing,
supra note 5, at 615-17 (criminal).
161. The discussion of civil cases is specifically limited to cases involving property.
162. E.J.S. v. State, 754 P.2d 749, 752 (Alaska 1988) (parental rights termination; no due
process violation).
163. In re W.J.C., 369 N.W.2d 162, 164 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (involuntary commitment;
no due process violation).
164. Indeed, it is because the topic is so large and interesting that it is beyond the scope of
this note. The diversity of interests that may be threatened and the different levels of impor-
tance various courts could give to these interests make it an Eldridge analysis minefield. See
United States v. Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d 1537, 1544 (10th Cir. 1987) (restitution hearing; no due
process violation); State v. Rhodes, 803 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1991) (no discussion of due process
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portance of the litigant's interest in each case is not changed by the
choice of telephonic testimony over a deposition. If the court restricts
the use of depositions for specific categories of interests, 6 ' these distinc-
tions should similarly restrict telephonic testimony. Finally, section
II(A)(2) of this note concluded that telephonic testimony, using adequate
safeguards, presents more reliable information to the trier of fact than a
deposition. This is primarily due to the fact that telephonic testimony
provides oral demeanor evidence.166 This conclusion is equally valid
under the Roberts or Eldridge analysis. Therefore, using telephonic testi-
mony in place of a deposition does not increase the "risk of an erroneous
deprivation;""67 rather it decreases this risk.
Under this instrumental approach to due process, there is no gov-
ernment interest in preferring depositions to telephonic testimony, no in-
creased risk from a party using telephonic testimony in place of a
deposition, and no change in the interests of the private litigant. There-
fore, due process will not bar properly conducted telephonic testimony in
civil trials.16 s Two states1 69 and one legal commentator17 0 have reached
similar conclusions.
B. An Intrinsic Approach
Perhaps a more convincing explanation for the slow acceptance of
telephonic testimony in civil trials comes from the intrinsic approach to
due process analysis.17 1 This approach focuses on the significance of the
process to the participants' view of the society in which they live.
1 72
where attorney testified by telephone in attorney discipline hearing); Clements v. Fairman, No.
85C10156, 1990 WL 7119 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 1990) (prison discipline hearing; no due process
violation); In re Plunkett, 788 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Wash. -1990) (prison discipline hearing; no
violation of "minimal due process protection"); Town of Geneva v. Tills, 384 N.W.2d 701, 709
(Wis. 1986) (violation of ordinance; due process violation from lack of defendant access to
documents used by witness testifying telephonically).
165. See supra subparts II(A) and II(B) (discussing the distinction between criminal and
civil use of depositions in federal court).
166. See supra section III(A)(2).
167. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
168. The more difficult question is whether it violates the Due Process Clause for a state to
force a party to use a deposition rather than telephonic testimony without a specific showing of
prejudice to the objecting party. Again, the state has no financial interest in most circum-
stances in preferring depositions to telephonic testimony. And, again, telephonic testimony
provides more reliable information to the trier of fact. But the loss of vocal demeanor may not
be a sufficient risk of erroneous deprivation to justify constitutionalizing a rule of evidence.
169. ALASKA CIv. R. 99; Wis. Civ. P..§ 807.13 (West Supp. 1990).
170. See Kuehn, supra note 22, at 316.
171. TRIBE, supra note 154, at 666.
172. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (allowing the opportunity to be heard is the best way to generate "the
feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done").
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Although intrinsic due process has been developed primarily in cases dis-
cussing whether a hearing is due, it is relevant to the fairness of the pro-
cedures used in the hearing.
Both the right to be heard from, and the right to be told why, are
analytically distinct from the right to secure a different outcome; these
rights to interchange express the elementary idea that to be a person,
rather than a thing, is to at least be consulted about what is done with
one. 173
Similarly, a court procedure that has little likelihood of changing
the outcome of the case may be valued for the dignity it gives the partici-
pants or the proceeding. Thus, a physical face-to-face confrontation in a
court may be valued by judges whether or not it has any significance in
the search for truth. 1 4 The intrinsic value of face-to-face testimony is
not mentioned in the decisions regarding telephonic testimony. But
when discussing the subject, courts often emphasize the tradition of testi-
mony in person rather than the scientifically or logically provable relia-
bility of such testimony. There is a feeling of concern in these decisions,
not only for rights, but for the appearance and respect due a court.
75 If
this is in fact the source of some of the judicial reluctance to use tele-
phonic testimony, it should be examined and analyzed overtly rather
than concluded covertly.
The primary criterion of the intrinsic aspect of due process is the
effect of the procedure on the relevant public. Most often the relevant
public is the person whose rights may be adversely affected by the proce-
dure. 176 But because the intrinsic approach shifts the focus from the
legal consequences of the decision to the political effect of the procedure,
the relevant public is any group of trial participants. In the courtroom,
both the jury and the parties are participants. Jury duty is one of the
primary participatory contacts citizens have with their judicial system.
While press reports of crimes and trials grab immediate attention, jury
173. TRIBE, supra note 154, at 666 (emphasis in original).
174. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986). The Confrontation Clause has been held to
serve "symbolic" as well as evidentiary goals. Id.; see Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988)
("there is something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation" as essen-
tial). In a forthcoming article, Professor Eileen Scallen argues that the Confrontation Clause
has an important "Societal" dimension. Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of Hear-
say Reform: Toward a Three Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV. (1992)
(forthcoming).
175. Aqua Marine Prods. v. Pathe Computer Control Sys., 551 A.2d 195, 200 (N.J. 1988)
(court will "not lightly disregard the collective experience and wisdom from which its proce-
dural predicates derive"); In re Stevens, 786 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (en banc)
(Newman, J. dissenting) (forcing convict to testify by telephone in his parental rights termina-
tion hearing violated due process because of evidentiary problems and "importance to father of
an opportunity to be at his counsel's side and to face witnesses") (emphasis added).
176. TRIBE, supra note 154, at 666 (intrinsic analysis "grants to the individuals or groups
against whom government decisions operate").
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service may form the more lasting impression of the fairness of the judi-
cial system. If a new and unconventional procedure gives the parties and
the jury a sense that guilt is determined by the evidence of remote and
unidentified witnesses, a judge would be justified in barring this proce-
dure. This would be true even if the testimony were reliable as compared
to other admissible testimony. Rather than confront this 'feeling' of in-
justice, a judge might feel more comfortable questioning the new proce-
dure on reliability grounds. However, putting telephonic testimony in
this suspect category presupposes that Americans today do not trust tele-
phonic communications to handle the important aspects of their lives. It
also assumes that Americans feel telephonic communication is unreliable
or suspect. While this may have been true in the early part of this cen-
tury, it is not true today. The phone touches so many aspects of our lives
so pervasively that its use has become second nature. Where the tele-
phone may have previously sounded "phony," it now gives us the phrase
"reach out and touch someone." 177 Most Americans probably prefer
personal contact to a telephone conversation. But to say that Americans
would trust a typed deposition read by an attorney more than the sworn
statement of the witness coming live over a speakerphone is surely false
in the 1990s. Such an assertion confines the popular idea of fair proce-
dures to a technological age long since gone. If a witness is unavailable,




Judicial acceptance of telephonic testimony has been slow. In crimi-
nal trials, this may have been due to genuine concerns about the Con-
frontation Clause. In civil trials, it has probably been due to a judicial
sense that telephonic testimony compromises the perception of court-
room fairness. Both concerns are difficult to confront in a vacuum. To
keep our judicial system consistent and rational, telephonic testimony
should be compared to common courtroom procedures on both the in-
strumental and intrinsic levels. This note has offered one comparison. It
concludes that telephonic testimony is generally superior to a deposition
on an instrumental level because it gives the trier of fact a better basis to
assess the reliability of a witness' testimony than the courtroom use of a
stenographic deposition. On an intrinsic level, this note rejects the no-
tion that modern citizens would prefer the reading of a stenographic dep-
177. "Reach out and touch someone" is a major advertising slogan of American Telephone
and Telegraph (AT&T).
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osition to telephonic testimony. If these conclusions are correct, courts
should accept properly conducted telephonic testimony as a substitute
for stenographic depositions. If general judicial conservatism continues
to keep telephonic testimony out of the courtroom in situations where
stenographic depositions are allowed, the modem public receives another
indication that the judicial system is illogical or anachronistic. If the
judicial system acknowledges the benefits of and limitations to telephonic
testimony by implementing new courtroom procedures, it brings justice
closer to the people.
